#### Headquarters U.S. Air Force

#### Integrity - Service - Excellence

# A4 Cybersecurity Transformation



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#### **U.S. AIR FORCE**





- Provide the Strategy for Cybersecurity Transformation
- Discussion Content:
  - Context
  - Problem Statement
  - Vision
  - Strategic Framework
  - Future State Vulnerability Based Risk Management
  - Assessment & Mitigation Key Steps
- 10 Year Action Plan





The Air Force operates in an *increasingly complex, highly digitized, cyber contested environment.* Information is as critical of an asset as jet fuel or ammunition. From IT systems to Operating Technology (OT), to "stand alone" devices, information permeates Basing & Logistics technology and processes. The Air Force is *highly reliant on these technologies and the information they contain to execute our mission.* 

Our reliance on information creates *asymmetric threats* that do not require our adversaries to be peer or near-peer in order to significantly disrupt operations.



#### Current Status of Risk Management

- "Compliance-Based" Risk Management
  - Shaped by DIACAP paradigm checklist
  - Compliance with standards vs. finding vulnerabilities



- Limited testing to simulate malicious attacker
- Standards do not reflect current threat environment
- Program Managers don't understand or respond to vulnerabilities for maximum risk reduction
- Interconnectedness of IT systems and information magnifies the vulnerabilities and increases the risks
- Lack comprehensive understanding of all vulnerabilities



## Current Status of Risk Management (cont)

- Program Management security testing
  - Acquisition KPPs -- Cost/Schedule/Performance
    - Security "bolted on" at the end rather than engineered up front
  - Cybersecurity personnel are often funded by or through the program office may not possess needed independence
  - PMs cannot test systems once in production environment
  - Automated vulnerability test configurations may provide a "Green Light" when vulnerabilities actually exist
- Basing & Logistics culture that:
  - Does not understand or appreciate the risks
  - Does not understand the individual's role in identifying, detecting, reporting, and mitigating risks





By 2029, the Basing & Logistics enterprise with have processes and culture where:

- (1) Cyber Ready Vigilant Logisticians are the norm
- (2) Limited resources are leveraged judiciously
- (3) Continuous monitoring with symmetric and asymmetric testing is the normal process to secure information
- (4) Vulnerability discovery and remediation are the drivers for risk management
- (5) Continuity of operations across the Basing & Logistics enterprise is assured for critical IT





#### **Pillar 1: Risk Identification**

<u>Goal 1</u>: Assess evolving cybersecurity risks

**Pillar 2: Vulnerability Reduction** 

**Goal 2: Protect Critical Information Systems** 

**Goal 3: Protect Critical Operational Technology** 

**Pillar 3: Continually Monitor IT** 

Goal 4: Detect vulnerabilities and harden on the fly

**Pillar 4: Consequence Mitigation** 

**Goal 5**: Respond Effectively

**Pillar 5: Enable Cybersecurity Outcomes** 

**Goal 6:** Strengthen Security and Reliability of the Cyber Ecosystem

**Goal 7: Improve Cybersecurity Activities** 






#### **Vulnerability Management**

#### Know that you know what you know

**Pillar 3: Continually Monitor IT** 

<u>Goal 4</u>: Detect vulnerabilities and harden on the fly


- Information Security Continuous Monitoring
- Auditing by independent agents
- Red Teams Bug Bounties





## **Continuous Monitoring**

- Focused on a handful of controls "At all times"
- Shifts non ISCM controls to program managers






### **Continuous Monitoring**

- Begin with a subset of controls
  - We use the "Dirty 36"
  - Forms the starting point for ISCM, ATO consideration
  - May be more or less, depending on the system, its criticality, etc.
- ISCM becomes the basis for continual authorization, continual monitoring
  - Controls tested daily, weekly monthly.... ATO decision is based on the system's ongoing risk level and risk tolerance of the AO
  - High risk systems are issues ATOs with short expiration dates to drive the risk level down and provide more oversight



### **Continuous Monitoring**





- Security focused on vulnerabilities as a key risk driver
  - Manage vulnerabilities & risk across the IT's life cycle
  - Information security continuous monitoring (ISCM) the norm
  - Robust Symmetric & Asymmetric vulnerability detection
    - External, independent testing through Bug Bounty/Red Team
    - Independent Security Control Assessor audits
- Cybersecurity workforce realignment
  - Align systems engineering with security engineering pre PMO
  - Institutionalize culture of "Sense and Respond"
- Automate cybersecurity functions
  - Real or near real time monitoring and alerting
  - System testing





- Provides an incentive to find vulnerabilities
- One time pass to baseline
- Goal is to have perpetual BB
  - Consider limiting to critical IT
  - Budget for fixes





- Compliance is still a necessary evil
- Cannot let compliance drive security \$\$ for the sake of compliance make risk based decisions
- The bulk of compliance falls on the program manager
  - Best source to allocate resources to make mission compliance decisions
- Leverage outside audit agents the same as a SCA



#### **Critical Initiatives for Success**

- Initiative 1: Vulnerability Based Risk Management
- Initiative 2: Cybersecurity Workforce Realignment
- Initiative 3: Automation of Cybersecurity Functions



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#### Initiative 1: Vulnerability Based Risk Management

"...controls are necessary, but not sufficient, and penetration test results—rather than compliance documentation—are better indicators of a system's security."

GAO report on cybersecurity in the DoD

- Implement a Bug Bounty (BB) for each of the next 4 years
  - Test 5 Priority 1 systems per year
  - Leverage lessons learned to harden across the enterprise
- POM for a "continual" BB program
  - Leverage SCA audits for non BB controls such as FIAR compliance
- Migrate systems to continual authorization/monitoring with BB as a key driver of vulnerability management



#### Initiative 2: Cybersecurity Workforce Realignment

*"...there are one million open cybersecurity positions today, it will grow to 3.5 million by 2021."* 

CSO Online 2018

- Rethink how we staff ISSM/Os across the enterprise
- Build a cybersecurity engineering division that works concurrently with the system engineering division
- PMOs only start to "bend metal" once a solution has passed the engineering and cybersecurity engineering design phase
  - Manning comes from the ISSM/Os in PMOs now
  - Cybersecurity is "baked in" from the start, not bolted on after
  - Independent tests performed by the SCA measure success
  - Reduction in the # of cybersecurity personnel goes down



### Initiative 3: Automation of Cybersecurity Functions

"Cyberattacks have become increasingly automated...To successfully protect against attacks, it is essential to fight fire with fire."

Palo Alto Networks 2018

- Leverage automation to enable real or near real time monitoring
  - Enable emerging technology such as AI to assume repetitive roles such as audit log reduction, monitoring
  - Monitor the enterprise for rapid interpretation of potential vulnerabilities before they become an issue
- Automate testing in development and production
  - Discover "coded" vulnerabilities before BB
  - Testing performed daily to discover deltas from desired state
- Reduce the need for cybersecurity personnel at the PMO level



#### Putting it all together

